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Abstract. The classical setting of evolutionary game theory, the replica-
tor equation, assumes uniform interaction rates. The rate at which individ-
uals meet and interact is independent of their strategies. Here we extend
this framework by allowing the interaction rates to depend on the strate-
gies. This extension leads to nonlinear ﬁtness functions. We show that
a strict Nash equilibrium remains uninvadable for non-uniform interaction
rates, but the conditions for evolutionary stability need to be modiﬁed. We
analyze all games between two strategies. If the two strategies coexist or
exclude each other, then the evolutionary dynamics do not change qualita-
tively, only the location of the equilibrium point changes. If, however, one
strategy dominates the other in the classical setting, then the introduction
of non-uniform interaction rates can lead to a pair of interior equilibria. For
the Prisoner’s Dilemma,non-uniform interaction rates allow the coexistence
between cooperators and defectors. For the snowdrift game, non-uniform
interaction rates change the equilibrium frequency of cooperators.
1. Introduction: replicator equation with uniform interaction
rates
Consider a two strategy game with payoﬀ matrix
AB
A ab
B cd
Strategy A receives payoﬀs a and b when playing against strategy A and B
respectively. Strategy B receives payoﬀs c and d when playing against A and
B, respectively. We denote by x and y the frequency of individuals adopting
strategy A and B, respectively. We have x + y =1 .
With uniform interaction rates, where players interact with each other indis-
criminantly, the selection dynamics can be described by the standard replicator
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equation[Taylor & Jonker, 1978, Hofbauer et al., 1979, Hofbauer & Sigmund,
1998, and Hofbauer & Sigmund, 2003]:
˙ x = x(fA − φ)
˙ y = y(fB − φ) (1)
The ﬁtness of A and B players are linear functions of x, given by
fA = ax + by
fB = cx + dy
The average ﬁtness of the population is given by
φ = fAx + fBy
The replicator equation assumes that the rate (or probability) of interaction
between two players is independent of their strategies.
There are three generic evolutionary outcomes:
(1) A dominates B:I fa>cand b>d , then the entire population will
eventually consist of A players. The only stable equilibrium is x =1 .
A is a strict Nash equilibrium, and therefore an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS), while B is not. We use the notation A ←− B.
(2) A and B co-exist in a stable equilibrium: If a<cand b>d , then the
interior equilibrium x =( b−d)/(b+c−a−d) is stable. Neither A nor
B are Nash equilibria. We use the notation A →← B.
(3) A and B are bi-stable: If a>cand b<d , the interior equilibrium
x =( d−b)/(a+d−b−c) is unstable. The two boundary points, x =0
and x = 1 are attracting. A and B are both strict Nash equilibria. We
use the notation A ←→ B.I f a + b>c+ d, then strategy A is risk
dominant. It has the larger basin of attraction. If a>d , then strategy
A is Pareto optimal, i.e. there is no other strategies the two players
can employ to have payoﬀ at least as high as a, and at least one player
having payoﬀ higher than a.
2. Replicator equation with non-uniform interaction rates
Now suppose that the probability of interaction between two players is not
independent of their strategies. Analogous to a chemical reaction, an A player
interacts with another A player with reaction rate r1,a nA player and a B
player interact with reaction rate r2, and a B player interacts with another B
player with reaction rate r3.
A + A
r1 −→ AA
A + B
r2 −→ AB
B + B
r3 −→ BBEVOLUTIONARY GAME DYNAMICS WITH NON-UNIFORM INTERACTION RATES 3
We assume that the ﬁtness of individuals is determined by the average payoﬀ
over a large number of interactions. Therefore, the ﬁtness of A and B players
are non-linear functions of x and y, given by
fA =
ar1x + br2y
r1x + r2y
fB =
cr2x + dr3y
r2x + r3y
The rates r1,r 2 and r3 are non-negative. The normal replicator equation with
uniform interaction rates corresponds to the special case r1 = r2 = r3 > 0. If
r1 >r 2 and r3 >r 2, then players prefer to interact with their own kind. If,
however, r1 <r 2 and r3 <r 2, then mixed interactions (between A and B) are
more likely.
2.1. A comparison with kin selection. In the context of kin selection
[Hamilton, 1964], games between relatives have been studied in the late 1970’s
by [Grafen, 1979], [Hines & Maynard Smith, 1979], [Mirmirani & Oster 1978],
[Orlove, 1978, 1979a, 1979], and [Treisman, 1977]. The “inclusive ﬁtness”
approach simply modiﬁes the original payoﬀ matrix M to
AB
A (1 + r)ab + rc
B c + rb (1 + r)d
where r is the coeﬃcient of relatedness. In this framework, all individuals of
the population are assumed to be related equally. The payoﬀ to a player in a
pairwise interaction is the sum of his own payoﬀ plus r times the opponent’s
payoﬀ. Grafen proposed a “personal ﬁtness” approach to account for the fact
that an individual is more likely to play an opponent with the same strategy.
In Grafen’s model,
fA = ra +( 1− r)(ax + by),f B = rd +( 1− r)(cx + dy)
where r is the probability than a player will meet an opponent with the same
strategy because of some genetic or social relationship.
More recently, [Tao & Lessard, 2002] developed the ESS theory for frequency-
depedent selection in family-structure populations. In particular, they use the
payoﬀ matrix
AB
A (1 + r/2)ab + cr/2
B c + br/2( 1 + r/2)d
where r is the probability to interact with a sib, to show the eﬀect of kin
selection involving full sibs on ESS conditions.
All these approaches contain linear ﬁtness functions. In contrast, our model
is based on non-linear ﬁtness functions and can therefore not be studied by a4 CHRISTINE TAYLOR
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simple transformation of the payoﬀ matrix. In our model, there will be new
dynamical features which are not present in the standard replicator equation.
[Queller, 1985] used a deﬁnition of relatedness which depends on the covari-
ance of the strategies of interacting individuals. Non-uniform interaction rates
lead to high covariance of players’ strategies, and hence a degree of relatedness
in Queller’s formulation.
2.2. Invariant transformations. For the standard replicator equation, there
exist some useful transformations of the payoﬀ matrix that do not change the
evolutionary dynamics. Here we show that some of these transformations can
also be used for non-uniform interaction rates.
Consider the equations
˙ x = x(fA − φ)
˙ y = y(fB − φ)
with φ = xfA + yfB and
fA =
ar1x + br2y
r1x + r2y
, and fB =
cr2x + dr3y
r2x + r3y
(1) Adding the same constant to all payoﬀ values, a,b,c and d, does not
change the evolutionary dynamics. We have
AB
A a + f0 b + f0
B c + f0 d + f0
Therefore, we obtain the substitutions
fA → fA + f0,f B → fB + f0,φ → φ + f0.
The corresponding ﬁtness of A and B players, and hence the aver-
age ﬁtness of the population, are all increased by the base ﬁtness f0.
Therefore, the evolutionary outcome and speed remain invariant when
background ﬁtness is introduced.
(2) Multiplying all payoﬀ values, a,b,c and d, by the same factor does not
change the evolutionary dynamics. We have
AB
A ka kb
B kc kd
Therefore, we have the substitutions
fA → kfA,f B → kfB,φ → kφ.
The corresponding ﬁtness of A and B players, and hence the average
ﬁtness of the population, are all multiplied by k. The evolutionaryEVOLUTIONARY GAME DYNAMICS WITH NON-UNIFORM INTERACTION RATES 5
outcome is still the same, while the evolutionary speed is increased
k-fold.
(3) For the replicator equation with uniform interaction rates, it is possible
to add arbitrary constants to each column of the payoﬀ matrix:
AB
A a + f0 b + g0
B c + f0 d + g0
We have the substitutions
fA → fA + f0 +( g0 − f0)
r2y
r1x + r2y
fB → fB + f0 +( g0 − f0)
r3y
r2x + r3y
φ → φ + f0 +( g0 − f0)
￿
r2xy
r1x + r2y
+
r3y2
r2x + r3y
￿
.
Hence
fA − φ → fA − φ +( g0 − f0)xy
2 r2
2 − r1r3
(r1x + r2y)(r2x + r3y)
fB − φ → fB − φ +( g2 − f0)x
2y
r2
2 − r1r3
(r1x + r2y)(r2x + r3y)
This transformation does not change the evolutionary dynamics for
uniform interaction rates. For non-uniform interaction rates, however,
such transformations will change the evolutionary dynamics, in general.
Only for the speciﬁc case, r1r3 = r2
2, the evolutionary dynamics remain
invariant.
2.3. Evolutionary stability. When players do not interact with players of
the opposite strategy, r2 = 0, then A dominates B if and only if a>d , while
B dominates A if and only if a<d .
With uniform interaction rates, if ￿ many B players enter a population of
1 − ￿ many A players, the ﬁtness of A and B players are given by
fA = a(1 − ￿)+b￿, fB = c(1 − ￿)+d￿.
A is stable against invasion by B if fA >f B for small ￿. Hence A is an
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), if
(1) either a>c ,
(2) or a = c and b>d .6 CHRISTINE TAYLOR
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The concept of an ESS was introduced by [Maynard Smith & Price, 1973].
With non-uniform interaction rates, if ￿ many B players enter a population of
1 − ￿ many A players, the ﬁtness of A and B players are given by
fA =
ar1(1 − ￿)+br2￿
r1(1 − ￿)+r2￿
, and fB =
cr2(1 − ￿)+dr3￿
r2(1 − ￿)+r3￿
.
In this case, strategy A is ESS if either
(1) a>c ,o r
(2) a = c and (b − a)r2
2 > (d − a)r1r3.
Therefore, the conditions for evolutionary stability does depend on the inter-
action rates r1,r 2, and r3.
If a>c , then A is a strict Nash equilibrium and cannot be invaded by B
for any choice of r1,r 2 and r3 with r1,r 2,r 3 > 0. Therefore, a strict Nash
equilibrium remains uninvadable for non-uniform interaction rates, while the
condition for ESS changes.
Consider the following example
AB
A 13
B 12
For uniform interaction rates, strategy A is ESS and therefore cannot be in-
vaded by B. We have A ←− B. For non-uniform interaction rates, however,
if
2r
2
2 <r 1r3,
then B can invade A.
2.4. Evolutionary dynamics. From now on, we consider the case r2 > 0.
Without loss of generality, let r2 = 1. We will show that for non-uniform
interaction rates, there are four generic outcomes, one of which is entirely
new.
Let us introduce the parameters
α = r1r3(a − d)+( b − c) (2)
β = r1(a − c)
γ = r3(b − d)
We list below the evolutionary outcomes of a deterministic two strategy
game with non-uniform interaction rates. We will prove these results in the
Appendix.EVOLUTIONARY GAME DYNAMICS WITH NON-UNIFORM INTERACTION RATES 7
2.5. B dominates A. If a<cand b<d , then B dominates A in the normal
replicator equation. We have to distinguish two cases:
(1) If c>a>d>band
r1r3 >
 p
(a − b)(c − d)+
p
(a − c)(b − d)
d − a
!2
then we have
A →·←·→B
The stable interior equilibrium is given by
x1 =
−(α − 2γ)+
p
α2 − 4βγ
2(β + γ − α)
.
The unstable interior equilibrium is given by
x2 =
−(α − 2γ) −
p
α2 − 4βγ
2(β + γ − α)
.
The bifurcation occurs when
r1r3 =
 p
(a − b)(c − d)+
p
(a − c)(b − d)
d − a
!2
As r1r3 increases above this threshold, α2 − 4βγ increases.
(2) If d>b>c>aand
r1r3 <
 p
(a − b)(c − d) −
p
(a − c)(b − d)
d − a
!2
then we again have
A →·←·→B
The stable interior equilibrium is given by
x1 =
−(α − 2γ) −
p
α2 − 4βγ
2(β + γ − α)
.
The unstable interior equilibrium is given by
x2 =
−(α − 2γ) −
p
α2 − 4βγ
2(β + γ − α)
.
The bifurcation occurs when
r1r3 =
 p
(a − b)(c − d) −
p
(a − c)(b − d)
d − a
!2
As r1r3 decreases below this threshold, α2 − 4βγ increases.8 CHRISTINE TAYLOR
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(3) Otherwise, if conditions in case (1) and (2) are not met, namely when
α2 − 4βγ < 0, we have the usual scenario where B dominates A. The
entire population will converge to all B:
A −→ B
Hence, for the ﬁrst two classes of games where strategy B is strictly dom-
inant, the evolutionary outcome can be altered by varying the reaction rates
r1 and r3. Note, however, that the invasion dynamics do not change. B can
invade A, but A cannot invade B. If initially most of the population play B,
then everyone will play B. If initially most of the population play A, then A
and B players will co-exist.
The bifurcation point is where the evolutionary outcome changes its course.
In particular, bifurcation occurs when
α
2 =4 βγ
When α2 − 4βγ < 0, we simply have A −→ B.
When α2 =4 βγ, and α =2
√
βγ, we have a tangent (or fold) bifurcation
point at
x
∗ =
√
−γ
√
−β +
√
−γ
=
p
(d − b)r3 p
(c − a)r1 +
p
(d − b)r3
.
As α2−4βγ increases above zero, the two equilibria move symmetrically away
from
x
∗ =
−(α − 2γ)
2(β + γ − α)
toward the neighboring end points.
When r1 = r3, we ﬁnd that the bifurcation point is at
x
∗ =
√
d − b
√
c − a +
√
d − b
Obviously when a>cand b>d , then the situation is similar with A and
B exchanged.
2.6. A and B coexist. If a<cand b>d , then A and B co-exist in a stable
equilibrium,
A →← B
The interior stable equilibrium is given by
x
∗ =
−(α − 2γ) −
p
α2 − 4βγ
2(β + γ − α)
.
The evolutionary dynamics do not change by introducing non-uniform in-
teraction rates. However, the location of the interior stable equilibrium, x∗,
can be shifted by varying r1 and r3.EVOLUTIONARY GAME DYNAMICS WITH NON-UNIFORM INTERACTION RATES 9
We ﬁnd that x∗ increases monotonically with respect to r1 and r3.A s
r3 →∞ , x∗ → 1; as r3 → 0, x∗ → 0. In particular, we can increase the
equilibrium frequency of A by increasing r1 and r3, and we can increase the
equilibrium frequency of B by decreasing r1 and r3.
2.7. A and B are bi-stable. If a>cand b<d , then A and B are bi-stable,
A ←→ B
Both strategies are strict Nash equilibria. The unstable interior equilibrium is
given by
x
∗ =
−(α − 2γ)+
p
α2 − 4βγ
2(β + γ − α)
.
For a bi-stable game, the evolutionary outcome stays the same with non-
uniform interaction rates. However, the location of the interior unstable equi-
librium, x∗, can be shifted by varying r1 and r3.
We ﬁnd that x∗ decreases monotonically with respect to r1 and r3.A s
r1 →∞ , x∗ → 0; as r1 → 0, x∗ → 1. In particular, we can minimize
the invasion barrier for A by increasing r1 and r3, and we can minimize the
invasion barrier for B by decreasing r1 and r3.
For uniform interaction rates, A is risk dominant if
a + b>c+ d.
This implies x∗ < 1/2 and, hence, A has a larger basin of attraction.
For non-uniform interaction rates, A has the larger basin of attraction if
α + β + γ>0.
This inequality can be written as
ar1 + b
r1 +1
>
c + dr3
1+r3
.
This is the condition that the ﬁtness an A player is greater than that of a
B player when the proportion of A and B players are equal. We argue that
this condition is the relevant criterion for risk-dominance in the context of
non-uniform interaction rates as it generates the larger basin of attraction.
Given a>cand d>b , it is not possible that a strategy is risk-dominant
for any choice of r1 and r3.
Let us focus on the special case where r1 = r3 = r>0 and r2 = 1. Strategy
A is risk dominant if
(a − d)r>c− b.
Consider the example
AB
A 41
B 3310 CHRISTINE TAYLOR
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For uniform interaction rates, B is risk dominant. For non-uniform interaction
rates, if r<2, B is risk dominant, and if r>2, then A is risk dominant. If
a>d>b>c , then A is risk dominant for any choice of r.
3. Application to Prisoner’s Dilemma
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the two strategies C and D denote cooperation
and defection. The payoﬀ matrix is given by
CD
C RS
D TP
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is deﬁned by T>R>P>Sand R>(T + S)/2,
and it corresponds to the case outlined in case (1) in section 2.5.
For uniform interaction rates r1 = r2 = r3, defection is the dominant strat-
egy. Hence, the entire population will consist of defectors eventually. We have
C −→ D.
However, if players only interact with opponents of the same strategy, then
cooperators cannot be exploited by defectors. In this case, where r2 = 0 and
r1,r 3 > 0, cooperation is the dominant strategy, because R>P . Hence
C ←− D.
Assume r2 6= 0, which means that cooperators and defectors do interact.
Without loss of generality, assume that r2 = 1. The selection dynamics depend
on the size of r1r3 relative to ρ2, where
ρ =
p
(T − R)(P − S)+
p
(R − S)(T − P)
R − P
Note that ρ is always greater than 1. We use the values set in [Axelrod &
Hamilton, 1981], T =5 ,R=3 ,P =1 ,S = 0, we obtain ρ ' 2.44.
If r1r3 <ρ 2, then defection is the dominant strategy. If r1r3 >ρ 2, then
there are two interior equilibria, one stable and the other unstable, in addition
to the two equilibria on the boundary. We have C →·←·→D.
At the bifurcation point, we have r1r3 = ρ2.A sr1r3 increases above ρ2, the
two interior equilibria move further apart from the bifurcation point, given by
x
∗ =
ρ
ρ +
√
2r1
.
Now let r = r1 = r3. Thus the cooperator-cooperator interaction rate is the
same as that of defector-defector. When r = ρ, we have the bifurcation point
at
x
∗ =
ρ
ρ +
√
2ρ
=
1
1+
√
2
' 0.41.EVOLUTIONARY GAME DYNAMICS WITH NON-UNIFORM INTERACTION RATES11
The frequency of cooperators, x∗, at the bifurcation point is independent of
any parameter. As r increases, the interior stable equilibrium point moves
closer toward 1, while the unstable equilibrium moves closer toward 0. So
the proportion of cooperators tend to increase monotonically as r increases.
As r →∞ , we recover the case where r2 = 0, and cooperation is the domi-
nant strategy, C ←− D, as defectors can no longer exploit cooperators. See
Figure 1.
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4. Application to the Snowdrift Game
In a snowdrift game[Hauert & Doebeli, 2004], two drivers who are caught
in a blizzard and trapped on either side of a snowdrift. They can shovel
(cooperate) or remain in the car (defect). If both cooperate, they have the
beneﬁt e of getting home while sharing the labor cost f, so the net payoﬀ to
each player is e−f/2. If both defect, they do not get home, and the net payoﬀ
is 0. If one cooperates while the other defects, the cooperator receives e − f,
and the defector receives e.
CD
C e − f/2 e − f
D e 0
If e>f>0, the payoﬀs generate the snowdrift game, in which it is best to
play the strategy diﬀerent from one’s opponent: stay in the car if the other
is shoveling, and shovel if the other is idle in the car. This corresponds the12 CHRISTINE TAYLOR
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situation outlined in section 2.6. The equilibrium frequence of cooperators
is 1 − f/(2e − f), where f/(2e − f) is the cost-to-beneﬁt ratio of mutual
cooperation. The average payoﬀ of the population at equilibrium is 2e(e −
f)/(2e − f), which is smaller than the average population payoﬀ, e − f/2, if
the entire population consists of cooperators only.
The equilibrium frequency of cooperators, x∗, is always an increasing func-
tion of r1 and r3. Hence the equilibrium frequency of cooperators can be
maximized by increasing the interaction rates between players with the same
strategies.
5. Conclusion
Evolutionary game theory was pioneered by John Maynard Smith [Maynard
Smith & Price, 1973, Maynard Smith, 1982]. His ideas brought game theory
to biology and population thinking to game theory. Maynard Smith invented
the important concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), which can
resist invasion of other strategies in inﬁnitely large populations. Evolution-
ary game theory has been used to study the interaction among genes, cells,
viruses, animals and humans. For a recent review see [Nowak & Sigmund,
2004]. Evolutionary game theory oﬀers an framework to explore the evolution
of altruistic behavior [Trivers, 1971, Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981, Nowak & Sig-
mund, 1992, Killingback & Doebeli, 2002] and human language [Nowak et al.,
2002]. Mathematical approaches to evolutionary game dynamics are based on
ordinary diﬀerential equations [Taylor & Jonker, 1978, Hofbauer et al., 1979,
Zeeman, 1980, Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991, Weibull, 1995, Tao & Lessard, 2000],
partial diﬀerential equations [Hutson & Vickers, 1993], stochastic diﬀerential
equation [Imhof, 2004, Fudenberg & Imhof, 2004], cellular automata [Nowak
& May, 1992, Herz, 1994, Lindgren & Nordahl, 1994, Killingback & Doebeli,
1996, Mitteldor & Wilson 2000, Irwin & Taylor 2001, Hauert et al., 2002, Le
Galliard et al., 2003], and stochastic processes[Nowak et al., 2004, Taylor et
al., 2004]. There is much current interest to study evolutionary game dynamics
on graphs, which also leads to non-uniform interaction rates. [Ellison, 1993,
Nakamaru et al., 1997 & 1998, Epstein, 1998, Abramson & Kuperman, 2001,
Ebel & Bornholdt, 2002, Szabo & Vukov, 2004, Ifti & et al., 2004, Nakamaru
& Iwasa, 2005, Lieberman et al., 2005] The fundamental Lotka-Volterra equa-
tion of ecology is equivalent to the replicator equation of evolutionary game
theory [Hofbauer & Sigmund, 2003].
In this paper, we have studied the eﬀect of non-uniform interaction rates
on evolutionary game dynamics. In the classical approach of the replicator
equation, the rate of interaction between any two individuals is the same and
does not depend on the strategies (phenotypes) of these individuals. Here we
assume that the interaction rates are not uniform. For example, players whoEVOLUTIONARY GAME DYNAMICS WITH NON-UNIFORM INTERACTION RATES13
use the same strategy might interact more frequently than players who use
diﬀerent strategies. Non-uniform interaction rates lead to nonlinear ﬁtness
functions and therefore allow richer dynamics than the classical replicator
equation, which is based on linear ﬁtness functions. We have analyzed the
evolutionary dynamics of all symmetric two-strategy games.
If strategy A is a strict Nash equilibrium, then it remains uninvadable for
positive non-uniform interaction rates. If A dominates B then non-uniform
interaction rates can introduce a pair of interior equilibria; one of them is stable
the other one unstable. If A and B coexist, then non-uniform interaction rates
cannot change the qualitative dynamics, but alter the location of the stable
equilibrium. If A and B are bi-stable, then again non-uniform interaction rates
cannot change the qualitative dynamics, but alter the location of the unstable
equilibrium. There is a new condition for risk dominance that depends on the
interaction rates.
For the non-repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, coexistence between cooperators
and defectors is possible if the ratio of homogeneous (C − C,D − D) over
heterogeneous (C − D) interaction rates exceeds a critical value. If C − C
interactions are as likely as D − D interactions, then the pair of equilibria
arises at a cooperator frequency of x∗ =1 /(1 +
√
2) ≈ 0.41 which is entirely
independent of the payoﬀ matrix, as long as T>R>P>S . Both equilibria
are stable, one consists of defectors alone, and the other consists of a mixture
of defectors and cooperators.
For the snowdrift game, the equilibrium of frequency of cooperators is in-
creased if homogeneous interactions are more likely than heterogeneous ones.
Spatial dynamics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma [Nowak & May, 1992, Killing-
back & Doebeli, 1999, 2002] leads to clustering of cooperators and therefore
always favors cooperators. Spatial dynamics of the snowdrift game, however,
can lead to intricate patterns of cooperators intermixed with defectors and can
therefore enhance heterogeneous interactions. This eﬀect can reduce the equi-
librium frequency of cooperators [Hauert & Doebeli, 2004]. Both phenomena
are in accordance with the ﬁndings of the present paper.
The analysis of non-uniform interaction rates should be extended to sto-
chastic game dynamics of ﬁnite populations. Furthermore, we can distinguish
the rate, rAB, a strategy A player interacts with a strategy B player, and the
rate, rBA, a strategy B player interacts with strategy A player. Here we have
analyzed rAA = r1, rBB = r3, and rAB = rBA = r2. It would also be interesting
to study evolutionary dynamics for rAB 6= rBA.
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7. Appendix
We prove our main results concerning non-uniform reaction rates. We ﬁrst
consider the generic case where none of the reaction rates ri is zero.
Since fA and fB are homogeneous in ri’s, after a change of variable (dividing
the denominator and nominator by r2, assuming r2 6= 0), we can writeEVOLUTIONARY GAME DYNAMICS WITH NON-UNIFORM INTERACTION RATES17
fA =
ar1x + by
r1x + y
fB =
cx + dr3y
x + r3y
The replicator equations can be reduced to
˙ x = x(1 − x)(fA − fB)
where x is the proportion of A players. and
fA − fB =
(ar1x + by)(x + r3y) − (cx + dr3y)(r1x + y)
(r1x + y)(x + r3y)
The equilibrium points are either on the boundary or in the interior.
At x = 0, the Jacobian is
J(x =0 )=fA(0) − fB(0) = b − d.
So x = 0 is a stable equilibrium if b<d , and an unstable equilibrium if b>d .
At x = 1, the Jacobian is
J(x =1 )=−fA(1) + fB(1) = c − a.
So x = 1 is a stable equilibrium if a>c , and an unstable equilibrium if a<c .
At the interior equilibrium x∗, where x∗ is the polynomial root of the nom-
inator of fA − fB, call it h(x), where
h(x)=( ar1x + b(1 − x))(x + r3(1 − x))
− (cx + dr3(1 − x))(r1x +( 1− x))
=( r1(a − c) − r1r3(a − d) − (b − c)+r3(b − d))x
2
+(r1r3(a − d)+( b − c) − 2r3(b − d))x + r3(b − d)
=( β + γ − α)x
2 +( α − 2γ)x + γ
where
α = r1r3(a − d)+( b − c)
β = r1(a − c)
γ = r3(b − d)
x
∗ =
−(α − 2γ) ±
p
α2 − 4βγ
2(β + γ − α)
At x = x∗, the Jacobian is directly proportional to
h
0(x
∗)=2 x
∗(β + γ − α)+( α − 2γ)=±
p
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depending on the root x∗.
For x∗ to be an interior equilibrium, we require that
0 <x
∗ < 1
This condition and the sign of the Jacobian at x = x∗ will help us to determine
the evolutionary outcomes of this game.
In order for both roots
−(α−2γ)±
√
α2−4βγ
2(β+γ−α) to be in (0,1), α2 > 4βγ must hold.
In addition, we ﬁnd that either
β + γ<α , α>2γ,2β, 4β(β + γ) > 4αβ, 4γ(β + γ) > 4αγ
or
β + γ>α , α<2γ,2β, 4β(β + γ) > 4αβ, 4γ(β + γ) > 4αγ
We focus on the case where β and γ are both positive, hence with uniform
reaction rates, A is a strict Nash equilibrium. However, with non-uniform
reaction rates, the selection dynamics depends on the magnitude of r1r3 versus
r2
2 =1 .
Under the conditions that a>cand b>d , β,γ > 0. Hence, we have
A ←·→·←B when α<2β,2γ. Since α2 > 4αβ, α<0 must hold. Since
α<0, we ﬁnd if a>d , then b<c ,s oa>c>b>d ;i fa<d , since b>dand
a>c , we have b>d>a>c . The conditions α<0 and α2 > 4βγ together
imply that A ←·→·←B if and only if one of the following holds:
(1)
b>d>a>c , r 1r3 >
 p
(a − c)(b − d)+
p
(a − b)(c − d)
a − d
!2
(2)
a>c>b>d , r 1r3 <
 p
(a − c)(b − d) −
p
(a − b)(c − d)
a − d
!2
The two interior equilibria are located at
−(α − 2γ) ±
p
α2 − 4βγ
2(β + γ − α)
In summary, the two-strategy games whose evolutionary outcome could be
altered by non-uniform reaction rates fall in one of the following four categories,
where either A or B is a dominant strategy:
(1) b>d>a>c , and r1r3 >
￿√
(a−c)(b−d)+
√
(a−b)(c−d)
a−d
￿2
.EVOLUTIONARY GAME DYNAMICS WITH NON-UNIFORM INTERACTION RATES19
(2) a>c>b>d , and r1r3 <
￿√
(a−c)(b−d)−
√
(a−b)(c−d)
a−d
￿2
.
(3) a<c<b<d , and r1r3 <
￿√
(a−c)(b−d)−
√
(a−b)(c−d)
a−d
￿2
.
(4) b<d<a<c , and r1r3 >
￿√
(a−c)(b−d)+
√
(a−b)(c−d)
a−d
￿2
.
The location of interior equilibria at
−(α − 2γ) ±
p
α2 − 4βγ
2(β + γ − α)
depend largely on the reaction rates r1, r2, and r3, as well as the signs of a−d
and b − c.
When r1r3 >> r2
2, we need to compare the payoﬀs a and d:
(1) d>a :
If b>d , we have an interior stable equilibrium at
x
∗
1 =
r3(b − d)
r1(a − c)+r3(b − d)+r1r3(d − a)
we can make x∗
1 → 0 by increasing r1.
If a>c , we have an interior unstable equilibrium at
x
∗
2 =
r3(b − d)+r1r3(d − a)
r1(a − c)+r3(b − d)+r1r3(d − a)
we can make x∗
2 → 1 by increasing r3.
(2) a>d :
If c>a , we have an interior stable equilibrium at
x
∗
1 =
r3(b − d) − r1r3(a − d)
r1(a − c)+r3(b − d) − r1r3(a − d)
we can make x∗
1 → 1 by increasing r3.
If d>b , we have an interior unstable equilibrium at
x
∗
2 =
r3(b − d)
r1(a − c)+r3(b − d) − r1r3(a − d)
we can make x∗
2 → 0 by increasing r1.
When r2
2 >> r1r3, we need to compare the payoﬀs b and c.
(1) b>c :
If c>a , we have an interior stable equilibrium at
x
∗
1 =
r3(b − d) − (b − c)
r1(a − c)+r3(b − d) − (b − c)
we can make x∗
1 → 1 by decreasing r1.20 CHRISTINE TAYLOR
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If d>b , we have an interior unstable equilibrium at
x
∗
2 =
r3(b − d)
r1(a − c)+r3(b − d) − (b − c)
we can make x∗
2 → 0 by decreasing r3.
(2) b<c :
If b>d , we have an interior stable equilibrium at
x
∗
1 =
r3(b − d)
r1(a − c)+r3(b − d) − (b − c)
we can make x∗
1 → 0 by decreasing r3.
If a>c , we have an interior unstable equilibrium at
x
∗
2 =
r3(b − d) − (b − c)
r1(a − c)+r3(b − d) − (b − c)
we can make x∗
2 → 1 by decreasing r1.
Finally we consider the special cases when ri = 0 when i =1 ,2, or 3.
If r1 =0 ,r2 = 1, then A dominates B if and only if b>c ,d .I fb<c ,d , then
B dominates A. If however, c<b<d , then we have a bi-stable game where
x =0 ,1 are both Nash equilibria, and (d−b)r3/((d−b)r3+(b−c)) is an unstable
interior equilibrium. Otherwise, when d<b<c , we have a mixed strategy
game where x =0 ,1 are unstable equilibria, but (d−b)r3/((d−b)r3 +(b−c))
is a stable interior equilibrium.
Similarly, if r3 =0 ,r2 = 1, we have A ←− B when c<a ,b ; A −→ B when
c>a ,b ; A ←·→B when b<c<a ; and A →·←B when a<c<b . The
interior equilibrium is at (c−b)/(c−b+(a−c)r1). Here, the greater r1 is, the
closer the interior equilibrium is to x =0 .